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Religious Experience, Justification and History by Matthew C. Bagger. 
Cambridge University Press1999. Pp. ix and 238. $65.00. 
JEROME GELLMAN, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
In recent decades, two types of defense have emerged for a positive 
epistemic valuation of alleged experiences of God. One, championed by 
William Alston, is the" doxastic practice approach," and the other, 
advanced by a number of philosophers, including myself, may be called 
the "argument from perception." The argument from perception trades on 
a purported epistemic similarity between experiences of God and sense-
perceptual experiences, begging for a positive assessment of the former, as 
for the latter. 
In this book, Matthew C. Bagger hopes to counter the new" apologists" 
(p.2) by presenting an ambitiously comprehensive philosophical position 
about experience and justification that will show both approaches to be 
mistaken. Extensively argued and sensitive to a broad spectrum of philo-
sophical issues, Bagger presents the most comprehensive response to date 
to the epistemic defenses of experiences of God. Although I appreciated 
Bagger's discussion at a number of points, I find myself largely unmoved 
by Bagger's main contentions. 
Here is my outline of Bagger's main argument: 
(1) Bagger writes that, "We experience what we infer to be the best 
explanation of an event. This inference usually does not work conscious-
ly .... " (p. 47), and "Experience includes an embedded claim about the best 
explanation of an event. ... " (p. 47), and "The logic of experience implicitly 
requires a commitment to an explanation. Experience includes inferences 
to the best explanation" (p. 58). 
If I understand him correctly, Bagger wishes to claim a pragmatic impli-
cation from an assertion of a proposition of the form: 
(1st) I experienced an F. 
to a commitment to something like: 
(2nd) I had an experiential episode the best explanation of which 
is that it was of an F. 
(2) Bagger adopts a version of a pragmatist view of justification 
(Chapter 3). Justification is conventional, contextual, and social, and con-
sists in providing reasons when challenged. There are no eternal, absolute 
standards or rules for justification. What counts as justification is relative to 
cultural conventions, which vary from culture to culture and within a cul-
ture from time to time. As Bagger puts it, "We cannot enumerate any for-
mal criteria of justified belief .... Any candidate for justification must con-
form to an ideal of human epistemic flourishing. Ideals of human flourish-
ing, however, bear the distinctive marks of time and place, era and cul-
ture" (p. 86). The "apologists" sin when they formulate a priori epistemic 
principles of justification, such as that perceptual beliefs enjoy a certain 
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degree of initial credibility. 
(3) To justify a claim about what has transpired is to propose the best 
explanation of what has transpired. "To justify a belief', writes Bagger, "one 
must offer good explanatory reasons, reasons that, when viewed against the 
background of all one does not currently doubt, contribute to the best overall 
explanatory account of the phenomena in question." (p. 83) Therefore, to jus-
tify my claim that I experienced God, I have to be prepared to advance its 
being of God as the best explanation for my experiential episode. 
(4) Therefore, to justify my claim of having experienced God, my 
implied explanation must be acceptable to current social conventions about 
"best explanation." 
(5) Nowadays, however, in Western, scientific society, no explanation 
that invokes supernatural causality can meet with social approval. To 
Bagger, a crucial feature of "modem life" is that "institutions of inquiry" 
are" completely independent of religious commitment" (p. 218). Thus, the 
modem inquirer "rejects any presupposition to inquiry not based on the 
natural evidence available to him and assumes everything ultimately 
explicable in terms of a unified casual structure" (p. 218). Bagger compares 
the invocation of God to explain mystical experiences to the invocation of 
miracles to explain natural phenomena: "The intransigence of certain well-
attested anomalies no longer leads to supernatural explanations, but rather 
to future insight into natural processes" (p. 223). To Bagger, then, it is a con-
ceptual mistake to appeal to supernatural explanation in Bagger's culture. 
(6) Therefore, in Western, scientific society no one can justify a claim to 
have experienced God. 
Claim (1) cannot be right as it stands. Consider that I might report on 
the same experiential event in quite different ways. For example, in report-
ing on the same episode, I might say both that 
(A) I saw the table made by my late uncle in 1945. 
And 
(B) I saw the only piece of furniture in the family storeroom. 
Bagger would have me committed to something like both of the following: 
(A.l) I had a visual experience the best explanation of which is that it 
was of the table made by my late uncle in 1945. 
and 
(B.l) I had a visual experience the best explanation of which is that it 
was of the only piece of furniture in the family storeroom. 
However, two different explanations could not be "the" best explanation of 
the same event. So, while (A) and (B) could both be true, (A.l) and (B.1) 
could not. I am afraid that the logic of "the best explanation" is out of 
synch with the logic of "experience," contrary to Bagger's first claim. 
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The double "best explanation" problem would dissolve were we to 
choose: 
(A.2) I had a visual experience the best explanation of which is that it 
was of something X; and (by the way) X was a table made by my late 
uncle in 1945. 
And 
(B.2) I had a visual experience the best explanation of which is that it 
was of something X; and (by the way) X was the only piece of furniture 
in the storeroom. 
This however, would make a mockery of the "best explanation" thesis. 
The idea that an experiential claim always involves an implicit judg-
ment about a best explanation is doubtful, in any case. A child who does 
not posses the concept of "the best explanation" or even of "explanation" 
seems to make perfectly respectable experiential claims ("I see mommy! T 
see mommy!"). Furthermore, there is nothing conceptually absurd in 
declaring, "I know it defies all explanation, but I am absolutely positive I 
sawanF!" 
My counter-suggestion is that we are endowed with conditioning mech-
anisms that often determine what we think we experience, not because we 
believe, consciously or unconsciously, that this is "the best explanation," but 
because this identification is simply triggered in us by our past and present 
experience. If we are not moved to examine our judgments, we simply stay 
with the prompting of our conditioning. This is basic to our epistemic life 
and the grounds for the position of the argument from perception that we 
start with what seems to us to be given perceptually. Sometimes, to be sure, 
we make considered judgments about what we think we have experienced. 
In such cases, we may be expected to provide a reason for so thinking that 
may (or may not) appeal to the best explanation. 
Alternatively, we make our identifications of what we think we experi-
ence, sometimes, at least, within practices in forms of life. Paraphrasing 
Wittgenstein, "This is simply what we do." J identify an experience as of 
God, then, not because I think that is the best explanation of what hap-
pened to me, but because I participate in a practice in which I (am to) take 
it that I have experienced God. That, of course, is just about Alston's posi-
tion about the social doxastic practice of taking certain events as experi-
ences of God. 
I will not be examining Bagger's conventionalist epistemology here, as 
enunciated in (2). I do want to say, though, that it does not accomplish 
what Bagger would hope for it. In the name of claim (2), Bagger berates the 
"apologists" for taking an old-fashioned, non-conventionalist approach to 
epistemology, because thinking of epistemology as having to battle skepti-
cism, rather than as reflecting current conventions. This leads them (us) to 
formulate abstract "principles" of justification, rather than bothering to look 
at what counts as justification on the ground. 
Bagger's complaint sticks to Swinburne's original statement of the argu-
ment from perception. This is because Swinburne defended the principle 
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of the presumed truth of perceptually formed beliefs because its rejection 
would invite skepticism about perception. However, such principles need 
not be defended on anti-skeptical grounds. For example, I have proposed 
such a principle (which I have since revised) on the grounds that its utiliza-
tion reflects our epistemic behavior'! I wrote that my principle was "a 
principle of rationality widely recognized as governing our everyday ratio-
nal discourse connecting experience to reality. As such its rationality is 
independent of its being shown to be so by philosophical argumentation." 
So I see no reason why my proposal, whether correct or not, should be 
rejected because of conventionalism alone. 
Specifically, Bagger rejects the idea that any experience, by itself, generates 
initial credibility, and that "We have no reason to grant prima facie justification 
to any belief" (p. 128). Principles advanced by the theistic "apologists" do just 
that, for beliefs formed from perceptual experience. By Bagger's lights, how-
ever, the question should not be whether we have reason to do so, but 
whether current fashions of explanation and justification allow it to be so. 
While I no longer believe perceptual beliefs are decisive in the absence of 
counter-colLsiderations, it does seem clear that in our epistemic lives percep-
tual beliefs have at least some credibility to start with. Whether the initial cred-
ibility of perceptual beliefs applies well to mystical perception, is of course a 
good question, one that should be examined on the merits of the case. 
In the name of claim (3), Bagger has objected to the "protective inten-
tions" of the argument from perception, as "privileging one possible expla-
nation" of alleged mystical experiences of God, namely the theistic one (p. 
134). Referring to a version of it I once set forth, he writes that the "Oxford 
strategy" is "baldly protective and illegitimate" (p. 134; "Oxford strategy" 
because originating with Richard Swinburne, of Oxford). Bagger says this, 
I suppose, because the argument from perception begins with a prima facie 
case for the genuineness of God-perceptions, and only then proceeds to 
counter-arguments. However, the argument from perception does not 
illicitly favor the theistic understanding of God-perceptions. Starting with a 
prima facie case for the genuineness of God-perceptions, serves only as a 
way of ordering the discussion, and lacks intrinsic epistemological signifi-
cance. At the end of the day, the justification for thinking God-perceptions 
evidentially worthy will depend on the total relevant evidence, for and 
against. The order in which we place the evidence before us matters not at 
all. As long as the defender of the argument from perception is open to 
counter-arguments, therefore, no protective coating covers the manner of 
argumentation. 
The point of opening with the case in favor of the validity of theistic 
experiences is more historical than epistemological. Since before 
Swinburne philosophers had little to say in favor of mystical experiences of 
God having any evidential value, and often thought of them as mere "sub-
jective" states, it is worthwhile to start by declaring that such experiences 
indeed carry some initial evidential value. The argument from perception, 
therefore, should be absolved of the charge of protective intentions. 
With regard to claim (5), Bagger ignores the massive numbers of tradi-
tional religious believers in modern societies like the United States, in 
which he writes. For these devotees supernatural explanation is alive and 
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well. Bagger also ignores the mass culture of "unchurched spirituality," 
much of which also recognizes supernatural causation. There is no deny-
ing a prominent, pervasive cultural phenomenon of people happily using 
supernatural explanation along with recognition of scientific modes of 
inquiry. It is far from true that scientific inquiry has supplanted supernat-
ural explanation in Western societies. 
Bagger, of course, is right that many people in Western culture exclude 
supernatural explanation in the name of modern modes of inquiry. 
Apparently, two subcultures live together in modem societies, one that 
thinks in terms of supernatural explanation, and one that does not. The lat-
ter subculture might be more prominent than the former in prestigious 
academic circles and have greater access to centers of power in Western 
countries. It hardly follows that this reflects, in numbers and cultural sig-
nificance, a dominant convention concerning "good explanation" in mod-
em Western societies. 
Suppose, though, Bagger were able to show the dominance of an 
exclusively scientific understanding of what makes for a good explanation. 
Then the religious and spiritual cultures would be no more than an 
"under-culture" to those guided exclusively by scientific modes of inquiry. 
Even then, I would find unacceptable Bagger's rejection of supernatural 
explanation in the name of a conventionalist defense of contemporary 
modes of inquiry. Here is why. On Bagger's conventionalist position, shifts 
in "good explanation" are not based on epistemic criteria, but are zeitgeist 
swings. New explanatory paradigms catch people's interest and set off a 
shift that carries a culture to a different way of thinking. Alternatively, 
changing values push forward new or dormant ways of explaining. Shifts 
in paradigms of explanation are fluid and dynamic, complex and winding. 
Since this is so, I find unacceptable an a priori rejection of supernatural 
explanation because of contemporary modes of inquiry. Nothing in the 
conventionalist story could possibly generate an a priori prohibition purely 
in the name of a dominant current fashion in explanation. To invoke domi-
nant current vogues of good explanation as a roadblock to the advancing 
of alternatives contradicts the natural way in which ideas of good explana-
tion arise, challenge, and flourish. To reject alternatives solely because they 
are not the dominant mode of explanation would be to unjustly wield con-
ventionalism as a protective strategy of a most conservative kind. If this is 
what Bagger is up to, I find an inner inconsistency, if not incoherence, in 
his conventionalist argument against supernatural explanation. 
Instead of vetoing it the way he does, Bagger should have addressed 
supernatural explanation directly, considering its potential or lack of it for 
"epistemic flourishing." He should have examined the writings of theistic 
philosophers who have labored to square divine activity with a modem 
scientific understanding of the world. One way to argue against supernat-
ural explanation would have been to show that these theistic attempts fail, 
or must fail. This Bagger does not do. 
At one point, Bagger says that Alston wishes to convince the non-theist 
of the propriety of engaging in a mystical doxastic practice that recognizes 
valid experiences of God. So the argument might be that Alston could 
never succeed in this, since such a practice commits one to supernatural 
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explanation which, for the non-theist, is forbidden. In reply, Alston is not 
inviting the non-theist to participate in a theistic doxastic practice. All the 
non-theist need do is recognize that some of his culhlral comrades counte-
nance supernatural, along with natural, explanation, and that they also 
believe, perhaps, that this does not damage scientific flourishing in any 
appreciable way. A non-theist might resist this alternative approach, but 
unless she goes into a protective strategy, that resistance, as explained 
above, cannot be simply in the name of a conventionalist conception of jus-
tification and explanation. 
In addition to his main argument, Bagger devotes an entire chapter 
(Chapter 4) to the debate about so-called "Pure Conscious Events," alleged-
ly contentless conscious episodes. Bagger is against PCEs because they pre-
sume to be experiences without concepts, a possibility that defies Bagger's 
edict that experience "includes" best explanation. To have an experience is 
to apply a (conceptual) explanation to an event you endure. Bagger makes 
three objections of his own to PCEs: (1) If contentless, there would be no 
way for a subject to remember a PCE, (2) The subject'S conceptual-linguistic 
framework may continue to operate at an unconscious level in an alleged 
PCE, robbing it of its supposed lack of conceptualization, and (3) If a PCE 
occurred, it could offer no knowledge of any mystical reality (pp. 102-103). 
I think (2) is an important objection. A possible answer to (1) might be 
that subjects could know they had PCEs because a PCE is an event of con-
scious awareness. It should be possible for a mystic who endures a PCE to 
recall immediately afterward the very awareness that was present in the 
PCE, even though that awareness was not an object of consciousness at the 
time of the PCE. The mystic, recalling the PCE awareness, could note that 
the awareness had been of a "pure" type. A possible reply to (3) would be 
that to be of epistemological significance, a PCE need not, strictly speaking, 
be of anything. Instead, an experience can grant an insight, without super-
vening on acquaintance of any reality A person could undergo a PCE, 
which then granted acquaintance of states of affairs by a direct insight. The 
PCE plus the insight would constitute a complex mystical experience that 
afforded awareness of a state of affairs not otherwise accessible. I do not 
pretend to have an epistemology of "insights," but exist they do, and they 
cannot be dismissed as easily as would follow from Bagger's position. 
Bagger's book has several valuable features. It opens with an important 
exposition of William James on experience, and has a very good chapter on 
Teresa of Avila. Also, Bagger's chapter against the possibility of a PCE is 
the clearest I have encountered in the literature. For these the book 
deserves high praise 
At times, the book has a jarring, highly polemical tone against the" apol-
ogists." The book-cover features a painting by T.H. Matteson entitled, "The 
Trial of George Jacobs for Witchcraft. II Bagger may have intended to 
equate the defenders of genuine experiences of God with witch hunters. As 
it turns out, the cover may have a bit of an ambiguous import. 
Bagger writes that a central thesis of his book is that "philosophers can 
no longer continue to write about mysticism without detailed study and 
documentation of specific mystics and traditions" (p. 93). Replace "can no 
longer continue" with "cannot" and this is a thesis I fully endorse. 
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NOTES 
1. See Jerome Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief 
(Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1997), and Mystical Experience of God, a 
Philosophical Enquiry (London: Ashgate Publishers, 2001). 
Value and the Good Life by Thomas 1. Carson. Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2000. Pp. xii, 328. 
PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame 
This book is divided into three parts. In the first, Carson subjects several 
theories of value to critical examination and tries to show that many argu-
ments for or against them rest on answers to metaethical questions. The 
second part is devoted to discussion of these meta ethical questions and 
concludes with a defense of a preference-satisfaction conception of non-
instrumental value. In the third part, Carson argues that the most plausi-
ble preference-satisfaction theory is, if a deity of a certain sort exists, a 
divine-preference theory. 
The first part of the book consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 recon-
structs and criticizes the arguments in Mill's Utilitarianism and Sidgwick's 
The Methods of Ethics for hedonistic theories of value. Chapter 2 discusses 
several familiar objections to hedonistic theories of value. Carson takes 
these objections to show that many rational and well-informed people 
have preferences inconsistent with hedonism. He argues that proponents 
of hedonism must hold that such preferences are incorrect and so are com-
mitted to endorsing axiological realism. Chapter 3 is devoted to prefer-
ence-satisfaction theories of value. Carson argues that the most plausible 
versions of such theories hold that what is non-instrumentally good is 
determined by the preferences we would have if we were rational. He 
goes on to defend such theories against a variety of objections, including 
particularly interesting objections by Richard Kraut, Richard Brandt and 
Charles Taylor. Chapter 4 argues that Nietzsche's ilbermensch ideal consti-
tutes a distinctive theory of value. Carson tries to show that Nietzsche's 
theory of the will to power would, if true, strongly support this theory of 
value, but he concludes that Nietzsche has not adequately explained or 
defended his theory of the will to power. Chapter 5 criticizes Aristotle's 
theory of the good life, and it also argues against the Aristotelian theories 
of value proposed by Peter Geach and Thomas Hurka. A brief interlude 
following Chapter 5, whose purpose is to motivate the move to the next 
part of the book, reminds readers that arguments previously examined, for 
example, the defense of hedonism based on the claim that conflicting ratio-
nal preferences are mistaken, rest on metaethical positions such as axiolog-
ical realism that have yet to be scrutinized. 
There are just two chapters in the second part of the book. Chapter 6 
focuses on the concept of non-instrumental value. Carson defends prag-
matic criteria for choice of a concept of value according to which it is a con-
